Jenkins fight against Haslanger

Katherine Jenkins argues against Haslanger’s account of what it means to be a woman in her article “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman.”  Haslanger’s definition of woman is a “sexually marked subordinate.”  This also has the meaning of “usually observed or imagined to have a female body.”  It is based off the sex people think you are, and not the actual sex you are that places you in a subordinate social position, and makes you a woman, or not a woman.  Haslanger argues that if you look across race, class, culture and time this is the structure that is common to all women.  She makes it clear that she is only excluding those who aren’t observed or imagined as women, therefore not oppressed by male dominance.  Jenkins writes on how this account very strongly excludes trans-people, who should be respected and understood by the radical feminist. Out of multiple arguments Jenkins makes, her first claim is the most compelling.  Her first claim was that Haslanger’s account does not include trans within identified gender.  Trans people can easily be oppressed by male dominance and not be “seen as a woman” by the common stranger.  Jenkins gives four examples of situations trans people are placed into, and out of the four only one would be considered a woman in Haslanger’s eyes, when in fact they are all “woman” according to themselves. This is an extremely important case to make because Trans men and women are some of the most disadvantaged and marginalized people in society. This proposal of how woman should be conceptualized is unacceptable according to Jenkins, due to the fact it would remove trans women from being considered women.  I agree with Jenkins on this point that Haslanger’s accounts of what it means to be a woman don’t necessary work.  The question of what it means to be a woman is one of the most difficult to understand and answer, but when answering this it is of most importance that we include every female gendered person to exist, because when we start to exclude, we begin to deal with larger issues of inclusion.  Someone who would oppose Jenkins argument, possibly Haslanger, could say that trans people can still view themselves as “female gender” and not a “woman” because gender is scientific and being a “woman” is something that is socially constructed.  Haslanger is not excluding trans people from being “female” or the gender of their choice, simply she is stating that unless they are seen on the street as a “woman” (meaning their body appears so) they would not be oppressed by male dominance, which isn’t necessarily a negative thing.  This objection works because it explains that gender is not what is socially constructed, it is the subordinate social position of being a “woman” that is.   However, I disagree personally with this opposition because I think an important aspect to being female is being a woman, and I believe that those who are transgender want to be considered a woman, despite their physical makeup, because thats how they view themselves.  Haslanger should take that into consideration when defining what it means to be a woman.  Jenkins is correct and rightful in her fight against this account.