Jenkins

In Katharine Jenkins piece, Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman, her main concern deals with trans people. Jenkins feels that gender categories should respect trans people’s identity and include them in the category with which they identify. Most of Jenkins argument is based off of Sally Haslanger’s definition of a woman. Haslanger identifies a woman as a sexually marked subordinate. Jenkins argument is that Haslanger’s definition doesn’t, “solve the inclusion problem because it does not include trans people within their identified genders” (Jenkins 396). Although I do agree with Haslanger’s definition of a woman, I also agree with Jenkins position, to a certain extent, that trans people should be included within the scope of Haslanger’s definition and that gender as a social class and gender identity should be equally significant target concepts.

The difference between Haslanger and Jenkins in terms of gender identity is that Haslanger’s puts gender identity under gender as a social class and see’s it as a broad psychological orientation to the world. Whereas Jenkins see’s gender identity as an internal map and equal with gender as a social class. The aspect in Jenkins argument that I agree with is the fact that gender as a social class and gender identity should be seen as equal target concepts. This is because it broadens the spectrum of possible people that can be considered women, and includes trans people within it.

Someone that was to refute this argument would say that gender identity should not be included with gender as a social class to form two target concepts of gender because trans gender people that are not always observed or imagined to be women do not face the same degree of oppression. I understand that people arguing against Jenkins position in this manner would feel that trans gender people should not be included within the definition of woman because of differences in oppression. Although, I believe that Jenkins definition of gender identity as an internal map, offers a lot of interpretation and leeway in the overall definition of a woman. It does not necessarily state whether a female gender identity is necessarily oppressive or not but it allows for trans people to have the opportunity to include themselves within the definition of a woman. Trans people are very important for feminist purposes and the fact that they are not included within Haslanger’s definition is problematic because it raises concerns to the inclusion problem and trans people most certainly should be included within this scope. Therefore, having gender identity stand along with gender as a social class as equal target concepts satisfies the inclusion problem while also identifying that certain gender identities don’t necessarily mean they’re oppressive or not but have the potential to be depending on how that person’s internal map guides them through reality.

Overall, I see where Haslanger is coming from with her definition but I feel that by Jenkins making gender identity equal with gender as a social class makes the definition more stable and includes a wider variety of people that deserve to be considered women.